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Abstract— One of the greatest challenges facing rural 
producers stems from the difficulties in accessing markets 
majority controlled by the major distribution chains. The 
small quantities under production and the low level of 
investment capacity ensure that smallholders in 
particular encounter an asymmetric relationship with the 
retail sector. The European Union (EU), through means 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),has adopted 
strategies to overcome these obstacles through 
stimulating farmers to concentrate their own supply 
through Producer Organisations (POs).These POs, in 
addition to concentrating supply, also act to improve 
productivity and guarantee reasonable prices to 
consumers. The objectives of this article include 
analysing challenges faced by the concentration of the 
agricultural product supply chain through a study of POs 
in Portugal. The research findings arise from analysis of 
both primary and secondary sources of information. The 
research techniques applied were documental analysis 
and holding interviews with six key players. The research 
results demonstrate how the average level of PO 
participation in the EU stands at 46% but falls back to 
25% in Portugal. The results are also below those 
presented at the EU level despite accelerated growth 
taking place in the horticultural sector, which more than 
doubled its level of participation over the last decade 
(10% in 2005 rising to 26% in 2014). We conclude that, 
on the one hand, POs respond positively to the challenges 
of supply chain concentration; on the other hand, this has 
lacked the impact necessary to reversing the ongoing 
rural desertification in Portugal. 
Keywords— Producer organisations; Agricultural 
production; Horticultural sector; Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It was above all from the 1990s onwards that 
the agro-food industry began losing influence over the 
coordination of distribution and retail channels, which  
were captured by the major retail distribution chains . The 
omnipresent supermarket and hypermarket formats 
essentially form the most visible facet of this process .The 
change experienced in control over the market 
fundamentally results from the privileged position of the 
retail sector in terms of access to information about 
consumer behaviours and habits, the volatility in 
agricultural product prices; the concentration in the sector 
through means of mergers and acquisitions ; among others 
(EC, 2009; Velázquez and Buffaria, 2017). 
These transformations provided consumers not 
only with access to a greater variety of better quality 
products but also declining prices. The latter trends 
stemmed both from economies of scale and from the rise 
in the negotiating power of retailers over their suppliers. 
This process has indeed witnessed a growing 
concentration of negotiating power in the retail sector and 
becoming especially able to impose their terms on inputs 
from small scale farmers. 
These transformations have enabled the 
distribution sector to attain a privileged position in the 
chain of value, especially within the EU context. Thus, 
agricultural producers and even industries in the sector 
became far more exposed to their power of influence. 
Hence, the positioning of the agricultural sector has 
progressively slid down the overall chain of value (EC, 
2007). Currently, the aggregated value of agriculture in 
the food chain accounts for 21% of the total against 31% 
in 1995. The food processing industry represents28% and 
with the distribution sector on 51%1 (EC, 2015a; 
Nicholson and Young, 2012; Cavicchioli, Cacchiarelli 
and Pretolani, 2016).  
In order to mitigatethis situation, the EU, under 
the auspices of CAP and through the Organisation for 
Common Markets (OCM), set up a set of instruments for 
regulating agricultural markets . The first stimulus for 
consolidating the OCMcame with the training incentives 
for Producer Organisations (POs),launched in the early 
1970s(EEC regulation no. 1035/72).Henceforth, POs have 
experienced various changes both in terms of their design 
and their objectives. From their initial function, planned 
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to facilitate the management of the post-harvest supply to 
the fresh produce sector, this then emerged as a means for 
improving on the competitive position of rural producers 
following the market deregulation carried out by the 
reforms of CAP that began in 1994(EC, 2009). 
The EU strategy to strengthen the negotiating 
powers of agriculture through means of POsarose out of 
the recognition of how the small scale of rural operations 
represented one of the main problems to commercialising 
their products. Therefore, there was the correspondingly 
perspective that concentration of supply might bring 
beneficial effects for rural producers to the extent that 
they might not only reduce their costs through economy 
of scale effects but might also boost their negotiating 
power downstream.In the case of Portugal, the level of 
organisation and concentration of production still remain 
at fairly low levels when compared with other member 
states2(GPP, 2015). 
Based on this problematic framework, this article 
seeks to analyse challenges posed by the concentration in 
the supply chain for agricultural products through 
studying the role of POsin Portugal. 
From the conceptual framework perspective, the 
current research seeks to corroborate other studies carried 
out on POs and the relevant factors that impact on the 
agricultural sector in the EU and in Portugal. From the 
survey made of POs, we may highlight the increasingly 
deep interconnections between agro-food systems. This 
trend shapes the competitiveness of the food supply chain, 
the distribution of the negotiating powers prevailing 
among its actors and, finally, its efficiency and economic 
performance (Severini and Sorrentino, 2017).In 
methodological terms, this research stems from analysis 
of primary and secondary sources of information. As 
research techniques, we above all made recourse to 
documental analysis and holding semi-structured 
interviews with six privileged informants, with their 
identities withheld and identified only by “E” and their 
respective interview number. 
The article contains a total of four sections. 
Following this brief introduction, analysis turns to the 
market powers of the retail sector and the challenges 
inherent to the concentration of supply (second section) 
and the EU strategies to (re)balance the negotiating 
powers in the agro-foodstuffs sector (third section). 
Subsequently, the article focuses on the role of POsin 
Portugal as regards the concentration and 
commercialisation of agro-food production (fourth 
section). This also analyses aspects regarding the 
constitutions and the general panorama of recognised 
POsand the challenges in the concentration of production 
in Portugal. Finally, we set out our final considerations . 
 
II. THE MARKET POWER OF THE RETAIL 
SECTOR AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
AGRO-FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 
CONCENTRATION 
After the 1980s, the main change taking place 
in terms of the workings of the agricultural market was 
the shift in the power relations controlling them. 
According to Dobson and Waterson (2001 and 
2003),there was a radical transformation: the replacement 
of the market power of producers/suppliers by the market 
power of retailers. This shift in power took place not only 
through the implementation of sophisticated logistics 
systems that enabled the storage of large quantities of 
products and their just-in-time distribution to the 
networks but alsodue to the capacity to meet the needs  of 
consumers through carrying out market studies and 
prioritising their own brands as a means of competing 
with suppliers.This combination of factors resultedin the 
growing capacity of the retail sector to influence the terms 
and conditions of unilateral procurement contracts and 
aggressive negotiating strategies with. 
The asymmetric negotiating powers prevailing 
in the market generate imbalances in keeping with the 
concept of unequal bargaining power.Thus, one of the 
parties holds sufficient power to impose unfavourable 
contractual terms and conditions on the other party, 
generally resulting in unfair outcomes from the social 
point of view (Inderst and Mazzarotto, 2008). As the 
authors refer, this process falls under the definition of 
buyer power(oligopolistic/monopolistic market powers / 
powers of monopsony)that,in a broader sense, 
corresponds to the negotiating powers that the buyer holds 
over the respective suppliers. Such imbalances drive 
practices effectively restricting competition, with negative 
effects on the wellbeing of consumers, producers, with 
predatory prices, the elimination of competitors, among 
other consequences. 
In the agro-food sector, such weaknesses 
extend beyond the concentration of supply and, despite 
the enormous technological advances, the segment 
remains entirely hostage to climate conditions, soil 
fertility, product perishability and seasonality. These 
factors generate instability in terms of production, pricing, 
storage, transport and commercialisation. These issues 
have been decisive in altering the negotiating power 
relationships prevailing in agro-food sector markets (EC, 
2009; EC, 2013; McCorriston, 2002). 
The way in which the market for agricultural 
products is structured is susceptible to oligopsonic3 
practicesdue to the fact that the retail chains may 
influence the prices, varying only in the quantities 
acquired (Sexton, 2012; Vasconcelos and Garcia, 
2014).Among the various existing market structures , the 
International Journal of Advanced Engineering Research and Science (IJAERS)                               [Vol -5, Issue-10, Oct- 2018] 
https://dx.doi.org/10.22161/ijaers.5.10.28                                                                               ISSN: 2349-6495(P) | 2456-1908(O) 
www.ijaers.com                                                                                                                                                                            Page | 210  
oligop sony differs from monopolies and oligopolies due 
to having an inverse structure given that the former are 
characterised above all by a small group of buyers in a 
specific field in which there are many sellers . This 
concentrated structure, just as Vasconcelos and Garcia 
(2014) highlight, assumes the prevailing existence of 
imperfect competition. The fact of having a restricted 
number of buyers takes effect through their strong 
influence over the formation of prices . In such markets, 
sellers commercialise their products at the prices defined 
by the buyer due to the restrictions in place over any 
increase in price, with that defined by the buyer the final 
price in effect. In such cases, should there be any price 
rises, the tendency is for buyers to acquire products from 
other suppliers. 
In the case of agricultural markets, studies 
carried out by Rogers and Sexton (1994) and Felis and 
Garrido (2015) demonstrate the trend towards the 
concentration of power in the retail sector, greater in this 
sector when compared to other segments, and thus 
reflecting the more limited scope for rural producers.The 
research conclusions from the Sexton and Zhag (2006) 
study on the United States report the behaviours of 
supermarket chains for fresh produce and other products . 
Other research also brought to light similar 
concerns about the negative implications of 
concentrating power in the markets for agricultural 
products. The Sexton (2012) study identified a loss of 
economic vitality in rural areas due to the inequalities in 
their negotiating powers . As collateral effects of this 
concentration of power, Dobson et al. (2001) highlight 
the control wielded over suppliers . Furthermore, the 
United Kingdom’s Competition Commission’s report 
(DFID, 2004) detectedimbalances in the negotiating 
powers of producers and buyers. 
Studies by Wilkinson (2006)had already 
identified the trend towards the concentration of power in 
the retail sector at the global level. The large companies 
operating in the processing segment lost ground in the 
face of the large supermarket chains . In adopting their 
own “generic”brands, they also provided lower prices and 
lessened their dependence on suppliers even while faced 
by the importance of the leading brands due to the 
capacity of their images to influence consumer choices . 
Research by Lianos and Lombardi (2016) 
examinedpower and the level of concentration of the 
market for agricultural produce over the extent of the food 
supply chain. This study arrived at conclusions pointing 
to losses in overall wellbeing, especially for producers 
with lower levels of negotiating power. Hence, the greater 
the concentration in the processing and retail stages, the 
greater the vulnerability of the interests of both farmers 
and consumers in the resulting supply chain. 
Out of this trend emerges at least three 
characteristics: the existence of only a small number of 
buyersbut on very large scales ; the domination of the 
market by these actors, which leaves producers with few 
alternative outlets for their products and are compelled to 
maintain constant pricesand; the creation of barriers to 
entrance as a means of pre-reserving market outputs and 
avoiding the arrival of any new competitors .These 
practices, even while low in profile, are recurrent and 
harmful, especially to agriculture smallholders that 
cannot meet the requirements imposed and are thus 
effectively cast out of the marketplace. 
The issues around the concentration of the 
retail markets remain far from resolved. The trend is for 
them to become still more concentrated resulting from 
mergers and acquisitions and not uncommonly from 
disloyal competitive practices, which results in an 
unequal distribution of income over the course of the 
supply chain of value. What has aggravated this scenario 
is how such a reality has turned into common practice in 
an apparently inexorable process (McCorriston, 2002; 
McCorristonet al.,2013; Kinsey, 2013; Felis and Garrido, 
2015; Sexton, 2012)at least over the short and medium 
term. 
Deriving from this trend, in many EUregions, 
and especially  inPortugal,there are a significant number 
of producers harmed by processes of directly participating 
in the market. Even when achieving a relativeperformance 
in terms of production and productivity, this pattern 
reproduces and worsens inequalities in the distribution of 
income, continuing the rural exodus through 
unemployment and social and economic exclusionand 
regional breakdowns in economic and social development 
processes. 
 
III. EU STRATEGIES TO (RE)BALANCE 
NEGOTIATING POWERS IN THE AGRO-
FOOD SECTOR 
The weaknesses of the negotiating powers of 
rural producers in contrast with those of the retail sector 
ensured that the EU, in the CA Preforms for 2013-2020, 
established a whole series of strategies to re-balance this 
relationship of power. The recognition that farmers are 
frequently atomised and in need of cooperation to attain 
efficiency in production, commercialisation and 
distribution were underlying factors driving the reforms 
enacted to CAP. 
We would duly mention that the changes 
ongoing to CAP reach back to the 1990s with the changes 
in the support regime for production shifting in favour of 
a regime providing direct assistance to farmer income. 
This transformation had downsides for rural producers 
and left them more exposed to the market and still further 
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worsening their weak powers of negotiation (To thova 
and Velazquez, 2012; EC, 2010). 
This reform then strengthened the PO role in 
keeping with the satisfactory results hitherto attained. 
Indeed, since their launch in the 1970s, POs have spread 
from fruit and vegetables to cover the entire agricultural 
sector. Thecriteria for the recognition of POs feature in 
the European Parliament Regulation no. 1308/2013 that 
definesthe following objectives : concentrating supply, 
improving commercialising, planning and tailoring 
production to demand, optimising production costs and 
establishing set prices for the producer, encouraging best 
practices and providing technical assistance as well as 
mechanisms for strengthening the position of producers 
within the respective supply chains (EC, 2013). 
These new rules (OCM Regulation no. 
1305/2013)4enabled producers to jointly commercialise 
their products through POs. To this end, there was the 
need to observe the following conditions: 1) the POsare to 
make the farmers more efficient, providing support 
service that are not sales based such as storage, 
distribution or transport services ; and 2) the volumes 
commercialised by the POs are not to exceed certain set 
limits as stipulated by the Regulation.Furthermore, POs 
had to accept the commitment to obtain markets for their 
products, manage production in relation to demand and 
optimise production so as to stabilise prices, among 
others. This furthermore involves the definition of an 
operational program that details both the objectives and 
the means to attain them. The activities described in these 
programs receive financing according to a 50/50 division 
between the PO members and the EU (GPP, 2015). In 
order to receive financial support, POsneed to comply 
with certain conditions as stipulated by the Rural 
Development Program,in the case of specific exemptions, 
these are defined and decided upon according to a case by 
case approach (Velázquez and Buffaria, 2017; EC, 2013). 
In general terms, this recognises the individual 
benefits to farmers from becoming members of collective 
organisations of the PO type. To the extent that farmers 
are able to aggregate their production through organising 
into POs, they strengthen their negotiation powers both as 
regards both buyers (downstream) and suppliers of inputs 
(upstream). Hence, in groups, producers are able to 
negotiate better contractual terms and conditions , which 
in turn reflects in higher prices and the acquisition of 
inputs at lower prices, among other advantages (Sexton 
and Zhang, 2006;Herck, 2014). 
Another advantage associated with production 
that Herck (2014) identifies stems from the reduction of 
risks during the harvest period should the buyer refuse to 
accept the products in an attempt to force prices 
downwards. In this case, producers who are unable to sell 
their products in due time face losses , thus, POsare able to 
reduce risks caused in case of any hold-up time by the 
buyer. Furthermore, the vertical integration strategy 
enables access to new sales channels, for example, 
whenever retailers prefer to source products in large 
quantities so as to cut transaction costs (Reardon et al., 
2003). 
Additionally,membership of a PO, in addition 
to concentrating supply, facilitates access to new 
technologies and to the exchange of information. Through 
such structures, members obtain higher levels of earnings 
whenever compared with situations when acting only in 
isolation alongside intangible benefits such as the 
deepening of social cohesion, the network of partners and 
the development of specific competences , such as the 
capacity to resolve conflicts and conciliateindividual 
interests (Herck, 2014; EC. 2014).The studies by Herck 
(2014) report that larger scale POsreturn more advantages 
to their producer members as they are able to 
concentratelarger volumes of sales, obtain better prices 
and generally provide more services to their members 
than their smaller peers . In addition, the findings report 
that average prices are higher in regions with strong 
cooperative organisations and POs. 
Generally, there is a relativeconsensus around 
collective actor initiatives, such as the POs, representone 
approach to mitigating the imbalances in market power. 
However, there remain controversies when questioning 
this from a broader perspective. This almost always 
demonstrates the benefits resulting from "strength in 
numbers" but this may have limitations to the extent that 
this objective may not be attained due to hostile market 
conditions as is indeed the case with the retail sector 
(Eastham, 2015).According to the author,the POsmay 
have limitations on their capacities for intervention able to 
counterbalance the asymmetric forces or attenuate the 
negative effects of unequal relationships with the retailers . 
Furthermore, this highlights the need to consider the 
existence of other variables involved in this process, such 
as scarcity, level of participation, barriers to entry, 
product importance, and among others. 
While differences exist around this theme, the 
empirical studies by Sexton (2000)corroboratethe thesis 
that the growing concentration of the retail sector 
represents one of the main causes of the unequal 
distribution of earnings along the agro-food chain of 
value. Other research findings have also confirmedthe 
unequal allocation of the value generated by the chain of 
production with the corresponding identification of 
asymmetries in the distribution of fixed costs ,in the 
oscillations of prices and in the losses of perishable 
products (Felis and Garrido, 2015). Furthermore, studies 
have also reported on the importance of public policies 
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for the mitigation of the imbalances in the powers of 
negotiation when analysing the role of POs in 
counterbalancing the unequivocal relations prevailing in 
the marketplace (Cacchiarelli,Chiavicchioli and 
Sorrentino, 2016).  
The studies made by Velázquez and 
Buffaria(2017) and Severini and Sorrentino(2017) 
reported on the positive results obtained by the POs in 
demonstrating how the horizontal integration of farmers 
favourably impacts on their powers of negotiation 
towards downstream buyers . In their works, the authors 
analysed the regulatory framework of CAP in order to 
verify whether this obtains the objectives set in terms of 
strengthening producer powers of negotiation.The study 
conclusions list how the CAP’s measures and instruments 
have contributed towards improving the efficiency and 
income of farmers and the wellbeing of consumers and 
that the defined objectives are getting met even while 
there remains the scope to improve on the current 
regulatory framework. 
In general terms, with the latest CAP reforms, 
the POs attained greater flexibility even while also 
experiencing an expansion of their responsibilities 
especially as regards the application of operational funds. 
In this case, the requirements include each PO holding the 
capacity to define their own specific actions (Operational 
Programs) and guaranteeing that they align with the 
European policy objectives. These are the main 
challenges set for the POs with such demands taking on 
greater relevance in countries such as Portugal given its 
agro-food sector experiences significant weaknesses 
especially when compare with countries in the North of 
the EU. 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: THE ROLE 
OF THE POSIN CONCENTRATING 
AGRO-FOOD PRODUCTION IN 
PORTUGAL 
The concentration of supply through POs 
reflects a priority factor in Portugal as enacted by Decree 
no. 169/2015, which transposes to the national level, EU 
regulation no. 1308/2013.Based on this framework, 
transformations have taken place in Portuguese 
agriculture both in economic and in social terms. In order 
to describe the impact of these changes on Portuguese 
agriculture, we shall first set out a brief description of the 
general aspects regarding the founding and launching of 
POs in Portugal. Subsequently, we survey the general 
panorama of the POsrecognised in Portugal and, finally, 
details spanning the concentration of agro-food 
production in the country. In order to develop this item, 
we made recourse to GPP (Office of Planning, Policies 
and General Administration)data and excerpts from 
interviews with key actors. 
 
4.1 General PO panorama in Portugal 
The concentration of supply represents one of 
the leading means of POs facing the challenges of 
commercialising their products in markets with 
oligopolistic characteristics. Hence, evaluating the 
performance of POs in terms of their number of members 
and the value of the products thereby commercialised 
holds relevance in a sector experiencing difficulties, as is 
particularly the case with Portuguese agriculture, 
primarily made up of smallholders. 
From the regulatory performance of the 
CAPframework in Portugal, one of the core PO 
objectivesis to boost the level of production organisation 
in order to benefit not only the producers seeking to place 
their products in markets but also the downstream supply 
chain through contributing towards greater equity in the 
distribution of the value generated. Furthermore, this 
deems improvements to the organisation of production 
furthermore enable the development of medium and long 
term strategies, lowering barriers to innovation, market 
access and among other opportunities . 
With the goal of improving the distribution of 
value generated by the agro-food supply chain, the 
organisation and concentration of production is thus 
incentivised by the founding of the POs. The 
concentration of supply features as a priority, established 
by Decree no. 169/2015, which harmonised the rules for 
recognising POs across all the sectors covered by CAP, 
which made significant changes to the following aspects: 
reviewing the criteria for PO recognition, promotion an 
increase in POscales, the appropriateness of the minimum 
VPC (Value of Products Commercialised) value required 
for PO recognition, the launch of Producer Groups 
(PGs),among other alterations (Decree no. 169/2015; 
GPP, 2015). 
 
Table.1: Terms for Recognising POs and PAs in Portugal 
Sector or Product/  
Vegetable animal products 
Min. num. 
ofproducers 
Min. VPC in thousands of 
euros - POs 
Min. VPC in thousands of 
euros - PAs 
Cereals, oil and protein rich seeds, 
including maize 
12 900 650 
Cereals, oil and protein rich seeds, not 12 1800  1350 
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including maize 
Rice 12 1800 1350 
Olive Oil 25 1500 1000 
Olives 12 1000 750 
Wine 12 3500 2500 
Flowers 7 2300 1750 
Bananas 7 15 10 
FruitsandHorticulturalProducts  7 3000 N/A 
Fruitswith Hard Skins 12 500 N/A 
SmallFruits* 12 750 N/A 
Aromaticand Medicinal Plants** 12 250 N/A 
Transformed Fruits and Horticultural 
Products 
12 1500 1200 
Potato 12 2000 1500 
Cork 7 1750 1350 
OtherVegetableProducts  10 1000 750 
Wood, BiomassandResin 10 1000 750 
Beef 12 2000 1500 
Pork 10 8000 5000 
MilkandDairyProducts  12 8000 6000 
Honeyel 10 120 90 
Eggs 12 300 250 
Other Vegetable and Animal 
Products*** 
10 1000 750 
Source: Adapted from Decree no. 169/2015, CAP (2017) and GPP (2015). 
 
*Blackberry, Raspberry, Redcurrant, Myrtle, Physalis, Elderberry and Strawberry Tree Fruit. 
**Fresh or refrigerated aromatic and medicinal plants as stipulated in part IX of annex I of the Regulation (EU) no. 
1308/2013, specifically, saffron, thyme, basil, melissa, mint, Origanumvulgare (oregon/wild basil), p arsley, chervil, tarragon, 
watercress, rosemary, sage and savoury. 
 
These legislative changes took effect in 
regulations that set out comparable information about the 
POs formally recognised in Portugal, whether attributed 
on the grounds of sector or product. In practical terms, 
this provides the scope for a producer to be a member of 
more than one PO (whenever producing different 
products)and, similarly, a PO may gain recognition for 
more than one sector or product (GPP, 2015). 
The POs, by definition founded on the 
initiative of producers , have to comply with minimum 
levels of products commercialised and members, defined 
whether by sector orproduct as set out in table 1. The 
Portuguese legislation established the statute of PAs – 
Producer Associations as transitory structures requiring 
lower levels of VPC than those in effect for POs so as to 
enable them to adopt the measures and instruments 
necessary to convert into POsover a maximum period of 
three years (Decree no. 169/2015). 
Setting up POs requires compliance with 
various criteria, among which features the minimum VPC 
level and the minimum number of producers, which may 
serve as barriers to the launching of new POs.For the 
wine, fruit and horticultural sectors, there are minimum 
VPCsof between 3.5 and 3 million euros annually, 
amounts that doubled in relation to the previously existing 
legislation. Furthermore, no member may hold over 20% 
ofthe capital orthe voting rights either directly or 
indirectly, with this holding able to rise up to a maximum 
of 49% whenever this percentage correspondsto the 
member’s contributions in terms of the value of the 
products commercialised by the PO. However, the 
remaining members always have to hold at least 51% 
ofthe capital or the voting rights (Decree no. 169/2015; 
GPP, 2015). 
Under the terms of the current legislation, 
Vicente (2015)maintains that the majority of Portuguese 
farmers face difficulties in setting up POs . There is the 
scope to join the existing POs but these are dominated by 
the large producers and distributors and in which there 
would be little scope for influencing the strategies or 
operational rules. The author demonstrates these 
difficulties in accordance with examples from the 
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Ribatejo and Oesteregions of Portugalwhere setting up a 
PO would require bringing together 135 producers in the 
case of the fruit sector; 154 in the horticultural sector and 
890 in the wine sector.Furthermore, according to the same 
author, some POsrecognised in Portugal were already 
intermediate and autonomous distributors in the 
marketplace.However, there is substantial pressure to join 
the POsas CAPfinancial support is to a large extent 
structured and dependent on such membership.Benefitting 
from public policies requires an exclusive commitment to 
a PO for a specified period of time5. 
Another concern over the pressures to 
participate in POs was raised by Eastham (2014) due to 
the fact of members having to guarantee exclusivity over 
their sales to the POs in order to prevent parallel sales or 
members quitting. According to the latter author, over the 
medium term, this strategy may reducethe real impact on 
the revenues received by producers , not only by PO 
members but to all the sector. This concern has arisen due 
to the practice of some retailers adopting additional 
sources for supply as a means of reducing prices through 
means of threatening exclusion. 
Furthermore, the pressures on producers to join 
POsmay still further worsen the lack of coordination and 
the exclusion of small scale producers from the market or 
even from blocking the development of new POs. 
However, the current CAP objectives foresee POs 
expanding in scope and scale rather than in terms of the 
number of their members so as to gain negotiating powers 
as regards the main distribution network in accordance 
with the position adopted as follows: 
 
[...] this facet of public policy (CAP)for 
market access, is highly active and has been 
a policy transversal across governments , in 
conjunction with their different challenges. 
It has also always produced, according to 
my analysis,a great deal of success . It is 
clear that if you ask who are the farmers 
inside these PO structures? Are they the 
smallholders, info-excluded, excluded, with 
low levels of access to technology? No, 
they are not! [...] Therefore, I would say 
that obviously those farmers that join these 
structures (POs)tend to be the most evolved 
farmers [...]in their knowledge, in 
understanding the problems that the market 
presents them with, better evolved even to 
the extent of education – with higher levels 
of education or with more specialised 
training, etcetera. (E1). 
In this sense, the discussions on the direction of 
POsin Portugal generate substantial controversyas regards 
the strategies in effect for the agro-food sector to raise its 
negotiating capacity through means of concentrating 
supply, however We would highlight that expanding the 
POsinto the diverse agricultural sectors may effectively 
constitute a factor capable of driving the development of 
the agricultural sector but also contains its own significant 
limitations as already detailed. 
In general terms, over the period under, from 
2004 to2014, the POsrecognised in the horticultural-fruit 
sector registered VPC growth of over 200%. Nationwide, 
in 2015, there were 164 recognised POs,with almost half 
(46%) belonging to the horticultural-fruit sector. This 
furthermore highlights the considerable number of 
recognised POsin the animal products sector (18%) and 
cereals, oil and protein-rich seeds (33.2%).  
However, in other sectors of rural production, 
the level of PO representation remains poor. The cereals 
and meats segments display low VPCs, especially when 
compared with the fruit and horticultural sectors; 
additionally, in cases such as wine, honey, milk and olive 
oil, there are only a few POs representing these 
sectors..We would however highlight that in these cases 
there are strong cooperative producer organisations .These 
also fulfil the objectives around concentrating supply but 
do not hold the same function and hence were not 
included within the scope of the indicators under6. 
The total value of PO products stood at 737 
million euros in 2014,580 million euros in 2013 and 550 
million euros in 2012, which corresponds to growth of 
27% and 34%over this period.The VPC accounted for by 
POsrepresent 11% ofthe total value of Portuguese 
agricultural.The concentration of PO commercialization 
between 2013 and 2014 achieved 26% growth in general 
terms with significant increases in certain particular 
sectors and products, including rice, sheep/goat meat, 
cereals, wine, honey and olive oil. 
Subsequently, there has been continued growth 
in the VPC registered by POs in conjunction with their 
rising contribution to Portuguese agriculture, the 
horticultural sector has more than doubled its VPC over a 
decade, surging from 10% in 2005 to exceed 26% in 
2014. Meanwhile, despite this progress, these figures still 
fall well short of the EU average (43%) (GPP, 2015). As 
regards the changes introduced by Decree no. 169/2015, 
their impacts on Portuguese POs over the medium and 
long term remain uncertain, whether the concentration 
and loss of producers shall continue or fall away to 
generate new asymmetries  
 
4.2. Features of the concentration of agro-food production 
in Portugal  
In various sectors, the Portuguese POsplay 
important roles and especially in fruit and horticulture. As 
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already stated, the POsare necessarily majority controlled 
by farmers even while not exclusively given that the 
objectives extend to enabling some downstream 
companies to also move into production.The founding of 
a PO has in practice the main objective of getting a 
specific type of product onto the market and to this end 
requires associating with the companies that already have 
a commercial presence in the respective market.The 
quotation below details the role of the POs : 
[...] these POshave their capital open and 
are therefore open to other types of entity 
that may bring greater value to the 
organisation, [...] following their 
foundation. Having set the PO up, there are 
the applications made under the auspices of 
CAPto types of funding: one designated the 
‘Operational Fund’.In practice, the 
organisation applies for annual support that 
is designed to push it forwards, ensure 
financial autonomy so that it can do 
whatever it needs to do. Furthermore, in 
addition to this ‘Operational Fund’, [...] 
thePOs [...] may also apply to investment 
support measures for undertaking 
transformation processes and 
commercialising the agricultural outputs of 
their members. [...] This has been a very 
successful approach, especially for fruit and 
horticulture, [...] (E1). 
In Portugal, the fruit and horticultural POsare 
organised into such as FNOP (the National Federation of 
Fruit and Horticultural Producer Organisations ). The 
objectives of FNOP include defending and representing 
the interests of POs and APsin addition to staging events 
and initiatives able to promote and develop the production 
of their members, coordinating activities in the common 
interest as well as other actions, studies, training and 
information initiatives (Magazine 1, 2016). However, the 
stimulus for the concentration of production, represents 
the main criteria for choosing new fruit PO members : 
We have experienced [...]across all the 
country, [...]a truly violent phenomenon in 
terms of the reduction in the number of 
producers and the increase in area per 
producer. The case of tomato, for example, 
is very significant[…]. There was genuine 
specialisation of producers, they produce a 
lot and the area under exploration per 
producerhas also soared massively and also 
boosting productivity per hectare. Twenty 
years ago, the Cooperativahad around 
120tomato producers and who produced 
around 25,000tons [...]. Today, the 
Cooperativahas about 19 producers and 
with an output of almost 80,000tons per 
year (E2). 
 
These incentives for boosting productivity and 
expanding in scale may also further block the access of 
small producers to the market and effectively force them 
out of rural activities . The argument underpinning this 
stems from the need for the POs to grow in terms of scale 
rather than in the number of members so as to gain in 
negotiating powers with the major retailers, which has 
served to aggravate the situation faced by smallholders 
(Vicente 2015).According to figures from the INE (the 
Portuguese Institute ofStatistics), inthe period between 
2009 and 2013, 40,800farms disappeared from Portugal, 
with over 90% farming less than 20 hectares. The 
persistence of this strategy to expand the size of 
agricultural properties will only tend to accelerate the 
process of smallholders leaving the land. However, the 
stimulus for the concentration of production, represents 
the main criteria for choosing new POmembers fruits: 
 
[...], depending on their output, the quantity 
in tons that they can show us , if it’s a few 
tons then there is some justification, above 
50 tons per hectare, I suppose, 70 tons per 
farm, then is the justification. If it’s just 10 
tons, then there is not much justification in 
practice, therefore, [...]we do not accept 
members with 10 tons, 5 tons... because this 
becomes a cost that we incur for a low level 
of production (E 4). 
 
The arguments set out by the FNOP president 
corroborate the positions stated by the interviewees above 
in terms of how “without scale, there is no capacity to 
deal with market challenges”and also added:  
 
[...]the advantages of the production getting 
organised into POs is that we gain 
dimension through scale, we have greater 
power of negotiation, we have more 
capacity to supply larger markets, we have 
greater planning capacity, we have more 
and better information, indeed, we have a 
set of advantages already under exploration 
and still others for exploration [...]. (FNOP 
President, Magazine 1, 2016, p. 04). 
 
Furthermore, the statement from the State 
Secretary of Agriculture and Food Supply follows a 
similar direction:: 
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The current recognition regime 
contemplates[...] – not necessarily the 
number of POs but rather the increase in the 
production commercialised by these 
entities, fostering an increase in their 
average scale. This means having better 
POsrather than more POs.[...]Without the 
scale, there lacks the capacity to face the 
challenges of the market and a lossof 
effectiveness in accessing the support 
instruments (Magazine,1, 2016, p. 13 and 
14). 
 
Producers, on joining POs,strengthen their 
negotiating position in relation to both their buyers and 
the suppliers of inputs , in addition to reducing the 
inherent risks related to their agricultural activities , 
benefiting from economies of scale and accessingretail 
channels that would otherwise be difficult individually. 
As members of POs, they may invest collectively in 
activities and services with highfixed costs, access to new 
technologies, improving efficiency and productivity, 
consequently driving the return of better income 
levels.However, this risks accelerating the process of 
excluding producers and the desertification of the rural 
environment as producers unable to join POs run the risk 
of disappearing. 
In summary, through analysis of the studies, 
we were not able to verify any statistically significant 
relationship between PO size, profitability and efficiency; 
however, the majority of the research findings corroborate 
the argument put forward by the interviewees maintaining 
that concentration opens up opportunities for significant 
economies of scale and improvements in market access. 
Furthermore, the largest POs are more profitable as they 
are able to better distribute the operational costs through 
the commercialisation of great quantities and provide 
more services to its associates, especially as regards 
investments in technologies and management. 
 
V. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In general terms, we may conclude that the 
Portuguese rural sector has been undergoing profound 
transformations. Furthermore, we may testify to the 
success of the stimuli to concentrating the supply of 
products via POs and alongside improvements to various 
different aspects (productivity, innovations, access to 
markets).However, the greatest benefits have accrued to 
the medium and large scale producers with smallholders 
facing difficulties in accessing the public incentives made 
available via POs due to the small size of their farms and 
their corresponding lack of scale (POs resist accepting 
producers with such characteristics ). 
Based on the information analysed, we may 
thus verify the relationship between the size, profitability 
and efficiency of POs. This therefore reflects convergence 
with the main PO objective that involves concentrating 
supply (strengthening the power of negotiation held by 
producers). The means adopted in Portugal enabled 
growth in the levels of commercialised PO production. 
With a particular emphasis on the horticultural sector that 
more than doubled its level of coverage over the last 
decade (from 10% in 2005 to 26% in 2014), this level 
however still remains well below the EU average (43%). 
Among the limitations of this study are the lack 
of detailed analysis of the retail sector in Portugal and the 
level of concentration. Hence, this would suggest the need 
for future research on this issue and especially on the 
composition of the membership of POs in order to 
ascertain whether there is sustained trend to integrate 
medium and large scale producers to the detriment of 
their smaller scale peers. 
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1The five major distribution chains in Portugal account 
for 64% ofthe total market according to APED –the 
Portuguese Distribution Company Association, while in 
the majority of countries in the North and East of the EU, 
the percentages are still higher, with this percentage 
reaching 91% in Sweden (Berger, 2012). In 2011, in the 
EU, the five largest retailers accounted for over 60% in 13 
member states, with a weighting of over 80% in Denmark 
and Estonia (Nicholson and Young, 2012; Cavicchioli, 
Cacchiarelli and Pretolani, 2016). For further details, see 
Rioux (2015). 
2The number of POs variesamong countries in the North 
of the EU that have higher rates than in the South.For 
example, the level of PO production stands at 
                                                                                                         
approximately 25% in Portugal against an EU average of 
46%, while in Belgium and the Netherlands, this exceeds 
90%. For further details, see Magrama (2015). 
3Oligopsoniesreflect markets in which there are few 
buyers and many sellers .One example of these markets 
comes with perishable products such as tomatoes. When 
producers cannot sell their produce, they have no means 
to store it and thus buyers, for example, supermarkets 
stipulate the price which they are prepared to pay given 
that they know that sellers have no option but to sell as 
otherwise their products shall perish (Vasconcelos and 
Garcia, 2014). 
4Prior to this regulation, there were various OCMs each 
with their own rules. With the adventofthis regulation, the 
OCM became a single entity even while there still remain 
different rules in effect for the various types of product, as 
is the case with fruit and horticultural products with a 
differentiated support regime to that for cereals, for 
example, and entirely different to the case of potatoes, 
which do not receive any support (Interviewee, 2). 
5Remaining a member of the PO throughout a minimum 
period of at least three years or for the duration of the 
operational program, whenever greater, inthe case of fruit 
and horticultural products, orfor a minimum period of ten 
years in the case of the cork and forestry sectors (Decree 
no. 169/2015). 
6Olive oil sector cooperatives account for 36%, wine 41% 
and milk 62% of the total value produced in each sector. 
This explains the lack of PO representativeness in these 
sectors of production even while many of these 
cooperatives are now undergoing PO recognition 
processes. To learn more about the cooperative movement 
in Portugal. 
